A Critique of Particularism

I am inclined to disagree with several of the essential tenets of moral particularism discussed and championed by MacIntyre. I take issue with MacIntyre's notion that morality stems from the group and that patriotism is a necessary precondition for morality on several grounds. Firstly, what happens when "the group" and "patriotism" lead people to act in ways devoid of morality? Can acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing or heinous violations of human rights be considered moral? I am not satisfied with MacIntyre's response that even aforementioned actions can be justified simply because they may assure the historical continuation of a state. Similarly, I found MacIntyre's response to von Trott's actions in the reading very unconvincing. His argument may be further weakened by the fact that the goal of historical existence and continuation of a state can be achieved in innumerable ways, and it is nowhere implied that people within the same community will all necessarily take the same moral courses of action in order to reach it.  

Furthermore, the notion that MacIntyre "takes the continuing survival of the nation as a self-determining, self-defining entity as a basic good, able to support the claims of partiality against the interest of needier outsiders" is in my opinion flawed.  This statement implies that considering the interests of outsiders which may warrant attention or action necessarily jeopardizes the survival of the nation, which is surely not the case. When examining cost-benefit analysis of taking action and solving issues such as hunger or poverty abroad, these actions prove to be cost-effective and the "sacrifices" to first world nations minuscule, if existent at all (See Leathers, "The World Food Problem"). 

Lastly, from the idea that "morality demands the existence of a community devoted to moral education and correction, which is able to remind us of the dictates of moral reasoning, and bring us back to proper moral functioning when we have strayed from the path", I simply fail to see why this community cannot transcend national borders, especially in today's world, in which even within one nation a myriad of viewpoints can be represented. The nation is only one group or community, and as such can be considered only one source of moral values among innumerable other groups that people subscribe to or identify with internationally. The idea that nationals should be valued over outsiders, or that concern for those inside the border is somehow more social than concern for those outside the border is not inherent in the claim that morality demands the existence of a community. Nussbaum touches on this concept as she examines how national borders seem to dictate moral obligations, as well as in her discussion of the concentric circles theory, which does not strip one of local affiliations but simply allows for an extension of concern, attention and action to all human beings.