Sunday, June 10, 2012

The Bias of Utilitarianism 

       While completing this week's readings, I am inclined to agree with Thomas Nagel in his support of absolutism and his criticism of utilitarianism. One of my problems with utilitarianism which I felt Nagel did not discuss at great length is that within the "ends justify the means" argument lies an inherent notion that those who can afford the extreme means necessitated by the desired ends will inevitably come out on top and be able to decide the value placed on a human life (as in the case of Hiroshima), the value placed on a political candidacy (as in the case of Nagel's example) or basically anything else in question. Thus, this amounts to, for example, those with nuclear weapons being able to dictate what they deem to be the "greatest good".  An argument advanced for many utilitarian actions includes the fact that the consequences of not acting in such a way would be more devastating. This is highly objectionable as more often than not we are unable to predict future consequences and unraveling of events, as well as the consequences of our actions in their entirety. Furthermore, the question that follows is whether these aforementioned consequences can truly be quantified in terms of utility that brings about happiness or pleasure, as such things can hardly be calculated. Utilitarianism thus seems to be a self-interested, tactical philosophy which though unobjectionable on paper (greatest good for greatest number of people), presents innumerable conflicts in practice depending on which side of the "good" you are on.  

Societal positions effect on one's view point


An interesting concept in this section’s readings was the difference between Utilitarianism and Absolutism. In Thomas Nagel’s “War and Massacre” he states that the utilitarianism view point gives primacy to the concern with what will happen. In Nagel’s writings utilitarianism seems to be a view in which the end justifies the means. On the other hand Nagel presents the idea of Absolutism which as he states focuses on what one is doing. This view unlike utilitarianism seems to make the stand that the end does not justify the means. These two ways of thinking are of particular interest because of the fact that it appears that the position that you hold in society could greatly impact which side you agree with.
            From Nagel’s writings we can see that the Utilitarianism view is closely associated with a person that is in power or that has power over a large number of people. This view point is most often held by people such as the president or general of an army that must command a large number of people and do what is right for the whole group even at the cost of a few.  Nagel states that in this view “one should try, either individually or through institutions, to maximize good and minimize evil, and that if faced with the possibility of preventing a great evil by producing a lesser, one should choose the lesser evil” (Nagel, pg 489). Through this way of thinking one is able to claim justification for his actions, in order to produce the desired result.
            From Nagel’s absolutism view we can see that this is a view that is on the more personal level. This way of thinking is focused solely on oneself and the way that one interacts with the rest of the world. The absolutism view is intriguing because of the number of restrictions that one must abide by in this view. Nagel makes the statement that it is important to clarify that “absolutism requires that we avoid murder at all cost, not that we prevent it at all cost” (Nagel, pg 493). Nagel’s statement is powerful because he is ensuring that we know that in the absolutism view, at no point in time is murder or leaving someone to die considered acceptable. To this point Nagel presents an example of two extremes in which one cannot justify their actions under the absolutism view.  The first is in the situation in which one tortures and kills a person in order to gain information on an enemy threat, the second situation is when a building is on fire and the rescuer chooses to leave one person behind in order to save several people.  In both cases Nagel states that “absolutism retains its force in that one cannot claim justification for the violation. It does not become alright” (Nagel, pg 496).
            The most intriguing part of Nagel’s statements between the differences of view point of utilitarianism and absolutism; is that the position that one holds in society has a great effect on the view point a person may have. For example the president of the United States must ensure that he do what is best for the country at all cost. In this position he has no other choice but to have a utilitarian view point because he must think of the country and its people first, even if that means resorting to taking the lives of a few to save the lives of millions. A person that is not in a position of power can more easily take the view of absolutism because he only needs to worry about his actions and how it effects those around him. 

Justice as a Flaw in War-like Situations


 Justice as a Flaw in War-like Situations

In Book II of Plato’s The Republic, the question at hand is, “what is justice?”.  Socrates comes across a man by the name of Thrasymachus, who finds justice to be the advantage of the stronger.  In defining justice this way, Thrasymachus has declared that justice is a burden rather than something that is useful; a person who is just will be taken advantage of by someone who does not care for justice.
            I find this notion of justice to be very interesting, especially when talking about the justification of and within international wars.  Take, for example, the My Lai Massacre during the Vietnamese War. Not to say that I agree with the actions taken by the United States soldier’s, however, if American soldiers are known to only follow just laws in war, then it would be advantageous of the Viet Kong to place themselves in a position where the only way for them to be found is if American soldiers committed unjust acts of war.  Knowing that American soldiers would not do such a thing, gives them an advantage to survival. The same thing can be said in many scenarios regarding warfare or acts of mass violence.  Defecting in situations can often bring about a better payoff for one’s self, especially in matters of life and death. 
            A thought that crossed my mind while reading Coady’s comments on Hobbes’ idea that there is a “need for limiting the damage by placing violence under the control of agreement, convention, and law-in short, at least common reason, and preferably common morality”, is why the same reason for us exiting the state of nature is not sufficient for us to do so at an international level.  The reason we enter into civil society is to protect ourselves from the violence of other individuals who attempt to take away our property or life.  Nation states are nothing but individuals in the international community, whose only threats are other individuals who may attempt to take their property or life.  If it is found beneficial for individual people to join a society so that there is “common reason, and preferably common morality”, why is it not beneficial for individual states to do the same?

Saturday, June 9, 2012

Situational Factors in War on Civilians


Morality in war is difficult define, especially in regards to murdering the innocent citizens of the enemy state. Prior to this week’s readings and lecture, I was partial towards absolutist point of view. I believed that war was fought between the armed forces and civilians took no role in the actual warfare and should not be made an object to target during war. But after this week’s lecture I tended to lean towards the middle of realism and absolutism in regards to waging war on civilians depending on the circumstances of the situation.
Nagel argues that war is ethical only if the fighting and killing was between combatant and combatant, but fighting between combatant and noncombatant (citizen) is absolutely unethical, regardless of the circumstances. This belief is a reflection of Morgenthau’s statement, which says that since “war is considered between the armed forces of the belligerent states, and since the civilian populations do not participate actively in the armed contest, they are not to be made its object”(83). I would agree that if the civilians are not participating in the war or not a threat to changing the dynamic of the fighting, they should not be objected to killings and bombings. An example of this would be the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The citizens of Japan were in no way going to change the dynamics of World War II, therefore they did not pose a threat and all the innocent lives lost was unethical.
But if the situation was different, and the actions of the citizens aiding the military would end up changing the dynamic of the war, I believe that subjecting the citizens to war would be ethical, as long as the citizens most definitely posed a threat. For instance, on the western front of World War II, the mobilization of the Soviet Union’s citizens dramatically altered the dynamic of the war. The people of the Soviet Union were under attack from their former ally, Germany, and in response, the Soviet citizens dug trenches, burned their own supplies so the incoming German armies would have no supplies, joined the Red Army, and flooded into war industries. The civilians’ heroic efforts and sacrifices ultimately led to the defeat of Germany. In this scenario, it might prove just to wage war on the civilians as well because they civilians “are actually able and willing to participate actively in warfare [and] ought to be the object of deliberate armed action” as Morgenthau stated. If the civilians do pose a huge threat, as the Soviets did during World War II, by supplying the front lines, then it would be in the best interest of the war effort to target civilians as well as the armed forces.
The idea that waging war on civilians depending on the circumstances of the situation, especially the amount of threat they pose to the war effort reflects Machiavelli’s philosophy. In The Prince, Machiavelli cautioned leaders to be flexible and adapt to the situations, because it is not good to do one thing at all times. I believe that in deciding whether or not to subject civilians to war needs to be based on this philosophy, considering all the factors of the situation, and having the murdering of civilians as a last resort for the war effort. 

Friday, June 8, 2012

The Morality of War


            The ethics of war is always a contentious idea. Many would find it difficult to admit that they endorse the killing of another human being, but at the same time are driven to support their country in an armed conflict. It seems that in war, normal considerations of ethics and respect for other’s well being go completely out the window. That something as perverse as mass killing can be romanticized as mentioned in the reading is testament to the idea that war is something far outside our rational realm of thinking.
            This week I tended to find myself agreeing more with the absolutist notions-for example, I find justifying the use of the nuclear bomb very difficult in my book. However, I grew up in a military family and it would be a while before I could denounce certain things; I’ve had the idea ‘war is war’ drilled into my head. Yet I cannot subscribe to the notion that war is inevitable. War is a worst case scenario. Humans are often prone to fighting amongst one another, but they evolve. Just like humans have evolved away from slavery and are moving away from capital punishment, norms can-and have been developing- that are moving the human race away from violent conflict. To posit that humans are naturally inclined to war and are unable to reject this instinct is a cop out and discredits man as a rational being capable of social and cultural evolution.
            Side note: In this week’s Economist there was an article about the morality of robots. As military use of robots rises and they become more complex, engineers are going to have to start making ethical decisions. Will an automated drone strike a building if there are 20 soldiers and 30 civilians? In my opinion, something interesting to think about as technology progresses.
            

Wednesday, June 6, 2012

Patriotism/Particularism or Cosmopolitanism



The readings that were assigned for this section were much more intriguing then I previously thought that it would be because I have always found myself leaning toward particularism. The readings Ethics of Nationality by David Miller, and Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism by Martha Nussbaum shifted me towards the middle of the debate.  Nussbaum states that  the ideal of cosmopolitan, “is the person whose allegiance is to the worldwide community of human beings” (Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, pg 306).  Miller states that Ethical Particularism holds “that relations between persons are part of the basic subject-matter of ethics, so that fundamental principles may be attached directly to these relations” (Miller, The ethics of Nationality, pg 286). As I stated previously before I read these two arguments I partial to Particularism/Patriotism, but after reading the two arguments I can see that moments in which I favor either Patriotism or Cosmopolitanism is strictly situational.
                David Miller offers a compelling argument that can be summed up in the words “because he is my brother”. As human beings it is only natural for us to be preferential or discriminatory towards those that we already have a relationship too. Throughout the United States examples of Particularism can be seen from loaning a family member money over a stranger or small business owners who only employ their families and friends; all the way to the international scale in which the country has preferential trading partners. Particularism is simply part of society and perhaps even part of human nature, and will continue to be for quite some time as long as we continue to place great importance on the relationships that we build with others.  
                Martha Nussbaum offers an equally if not more compelling argument for Cosmopolitanism for the simple fact that she was able to sway my opinion to include that cosmopolitanism is in fact better than patriotism/cosmopolitanism in certain situations.   Nussbaum’s most enlightening part of her argument is when see states that through Cosmopolitan Education, we can Learn more about not only others but ourselves as well.  One powerful statement she makes is that “Our nation is appallingly ignorant of most of the rest of the world. I think this means that it is also, in many crucial ways, ignorant of itself”(Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism, pg 310). The ignorance of the United States is a common accusation from nations across the world as majority of our nation has no idea what is going on around the world nor cares to know. It is this lack of knowledge that provides a situation in which the Cosmopolitanism view is in my opinion; the best view. Instead of being so inclined to what is going on in the United States we can become aware of what is happening around the world, which would in turn allow us to learn more about ourselves.   
A Critique of Particularism

I am inclined to disagree with several of the essential tenets of moral particularism discussed and championed by MacIntyre. I take issue with MacIntyre's notion that morality stems from the group and that patriotism is a necessary precondition for morality on several grounds. Firstly, what happens when "the group" and "patriotism" lead people to act in ways devoid of morality? Can acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing or heinous violations of human rights be considered moral? I am not satisfied with MacIntyre's response that even aforementioned actions can be justified simply because they may assure the historical continuation of a state. Similarly, I found MacIntyre's response to von Trott's actions in the reading very unconvincing. His argument may be further weakened by the fact that the goal of historical existence and continuation of a state can be achieved in innumerable ways, and it is nowhere implied that people within the same community will all necessarily take the same moral courses of action in order to reach it.  
Furthermore, the notion that MacIntyre "takes the continuing survival of the nation as a self-determining, self-defining entity as a basic good, able to support the claims of partiality against the interest of needier outsiders" is in my opinion flawed.  This statement implies that considering the interests of outsiders which may warrant attention or action necessarily jeopardizes the survival of the nation, which is surely not the case. When examining cost-benefit analysis of taking action and solving issues such as hunger or poverty abroad, these actions prove to be cost-effective and the "sacrifices" to first world nations minuscule, if existent at all (See Leathers, "The World Food Problem"). 

Lastly, from the idea that "morality demands the existence of a community devoted to moral education and correction, which is able to remind us of the dictates of moral reasoning, and bring us back to proper moral functioning when we have strayed from the path", I simply fail to see why this community cannot transcend national borders, especially in today's world, in which even within one nation a myriad of viewpoints can be represented. The nation is only one group or community, and as such can be considered only one source of moral values among innumerable other groups that people subscribe to or identify with internationally. The idea that nationals should be valued over outsiders, or that concern for those inside the border is somehow more social than concern for those outside the border is not inherent in the claim that morality demands the existence of a community. Nussbaum touches on this concept as she examines how national borders seem to dictate moral obligations, as well as in her discussion of the concentric circles theory, which does not strip one of local affiliations but simply allows for an extension of concern, attention and action to all human beings.