Intervention

Fernando R. Teson defends the United States’ invasion of Iraq as a justifiable intervention to set Iraqis free from the tyrannous reign of Saddam Hussein. He raises a good point that although the motives of the U.S. weren’t to serve as an intervening state; their actions led the Iraqis to their freedom from the dictator. The main aim was for the United States to find a nuclear arsenal that could cause devastating destruction not to rescue the people from tyranny. After the terrorist attacked, there had been great discrepancies in the Bush administration’s public statement and the intelligence community. The issue of possible ties between Saddam and al-Qaeda was especially prone to the selective use of raw intelligence to make a public case for war.

The war was conducted without UN Security Council approval and sold to a doubtful public on the grounds that the country harbored the al-Qaida terrorist organization and weapons of mass destruction. These all did a massive damage to the fundamental makeup of international law and set back the legitimacy of military intervention by the U.S. and other states. The consequences of the war gave the Iraqis and unstable democracy and economy while the unfound WMD damaged the U.S’ credibility.

The Iraqis are better off without Saddam Hussein but thousands of U.S. soldiers are dead, several thousand wounded and traumatized, Iraqi civilians who were killed, maimed and displaced not to mention the prejudice against American culture post Abu Ghraib event. So much was sacrificed in the name of the war; all for so little in return. The Iraq war also took a huge chunk of the United State’s defense budget.

Iraq is slowly developing and rising back from its chaotic uprising, yet its future is undetermined and shaky. It now has a representative democracy, which faces some hiccup from time to time. , I would have to agree with Nardin, that non intervention would have been preferred; it would have been less traumatic for both sides. I believe that the people would have rebelled even without assistance from the U.S because it is common in states with an emerging economy, after being repressed and deluded by a ruler for so long, they rise up to revolt and fight for their freedom, as it is in the Arab Spring.

Your Friendly Neighborhood Hegemon

            Something I’ve begun to think about while traveling recently is how citizens of other countries view the United States, and on a larger scale, how the international community views it. In my experience, it is very easy to grow up with the notion that the United States is a benevolent hegemon-more so in my case growing up in a military family. We are presented with rhetoric such as the ‘war on terror’-as if we were the good guys waging a holy crusade- and told that our military operations are all carried out with righteous intentions.

            I found it interesting that both Libya and Iraq are included in this week’s lecture; to me these two operations carry different perceptions of their validity and intentions. Iraq was the bastard child of the Bush administration and turned him into the nation’s lampoon and political scapegoat for the better part of a decade. Obama’s intervention in Libya is viewed in the public eye as a much more genial action-where US bombers soared as freedom fighters sought their sovereignty.

            The Nardin piece made me think. Was Libya really that legitimate? Perhaps so, but the ease with which Obama went into Libya contrasted with the apprehension to go into Syria really makes one wonder if it is all for morals. And like Walzer points, if the US is willing to go into Libya on such presumptuous circumstances with no real end game, how can it stay out of Syria where people are being slaughtered. I think it would be naïve to assume that all of our intentions are benevolent, but it can be unnerving to realize that the decision to intervene and save human lives can come down to power calculations. 

"Future Humanitarian Intervention at risk". Wait...Really?

Prior to this weeks reading, I don’t think I have ever heard the words “War in Iraq” combined with “Humanitarian”.  I never understood the war to be Humanitarian at all.  I did not need to read Nardin’s piece to be convinced that the war wasn’t humanitarian.  Nevertheless, I find the article insightful; in particular I found the idea that the War in Iraq has somehow damaged the opportunity for future humanitarian intervention.

             I find the whole idea to be self-defeating.  The issue with those who make this claim is that the United States’ primary concern when going into Iraq was not the liberation of its people; and for this reason, these people are in uproar.  They claim that by masking a self-serving initiative, democratic prosperity, with a claim of humanitarian intervention, the liberation of the Iraqi people, that the future possibility of Humanitarian Intervention is at risk.  But why would it be at risk?  Unless as a result of the United States’ actions, everyone else can longer see a potential target for humanitarian intervention when one exists.  If anything I believe that nations will learn from the mistakes of the U.S.  That even after all that transpired emotionally prior to the invasion in Iraq, the United States has struggled tremendously to meet their “self-serving agenda”. If nothing else, the United States handling of the War in Iraq should clean up future humanitarian intervention.  It should serve as an example of economic and human injuries that may occur through masking a self-serving agenda. I believe that recent events in Libya have bolstered the idea of human intervention.

            Even with the result in Libya, I do agree that there needs to be an overall reassessment of what a potential target for human intervention is.  But this may not even be the most important aspect to successful human intervention.  Something we all know is that people are more inclined to do something when there is a personal incentive involved or at least when there is not penalty for acting.  Human intervention cannot occur without some form of monetary flow.  If a nation does not receive a benefit as a result of spending money, why would they want to spend the money?  Most people would say because it is the right thing to do.  And I wholeheartedly agree with that.  But as the saying goes money doesn’t grow on trees.  It has to come from somewhere; and wherever it comes from it is most certainly not an endless pit.

The defense of the two Humanitarian Rationales

Fernando R. Teson says that the war in Iraq can be rationalized through two “humanitarian” ways. The first way is what he calls the narrow rationale, which states  that the war was fought to overthrow a tyrant. The second way is called the, grand rationale which states that the war was fought as part of a strategy to defend the United States by establishing a number of democratic regimes in the Middle East and throughout the world through peaceful means, if possible, but by force if it is deemed necessary. Many critics disagree with Tenson’s narrow and grand rational, one of which includes Terry Nardin . Tenson responds in an article named “of tyrants and empires”; in his responds to Nardin’s criticism to both his narrow and grand rationales. In my opinion Tenson successfully refutes Nardins claims against his narrow rationale but unsuccessfully refutes Nardin’s claims against his grand rationale.

            Nardin speaks of Tensons claims as the intention to overthrow a tyrant is a humanitarian intention and that any war waged with that intention counts as a humanitarian intervention, provided that it also intends to replace the tyrannical government. Nardin goes on to say that intervention is called for by the specific crimes committed (or permitted) by a regime, not the character of that regime (Nardin Humanitarian Imperialism, pg 23). Tenson refutes Nardin’s claims by giving the example of a military that overthrows a government, takes away all the people rights,  controls the media, the schools, and the universities. The military also targets people that disagree with the military and kills the leaders along with about two thousand people a year. The People hate the regime, but the prospects of peaceful or violent return to democracy are unlikely, because the regime has military might. In this situation it does not satisfy the strict standards set by Nardin (Teson, Of Tyrants and Empires, pg 28).There are no massive killings, no extermination camps, no genocide, no ethnic cleansing; the people deserve a right to seek help from outside the country. The example shows how humanitarian intervention could be necessary even though it does not meet the normal regulations for outside intervention that Nardin speaks of in her critic of Tenson’s writing.

             Nardin states that Tenson’s grand rationale changes the focus of debate from concern for another countries citizens’ rights, security, and well-being to concern for what is in the best interests of the intervening state and its citizens. Nardin says that “Unlike humanitarian intervention, which aims to protect other people, the American strategy of "spreading democracy" is aimed at protecting us”(Nardin, Humanitarian Imperialism, pg 23).  Tenson  rebuttals by saying that he suggest that whether the United States had a good motive is irrelevant in  justifying the intervention, the United States' motive for invading Iraq was not obviously wrong. Tenson does not make a compelling argument as to why his view point is correct as opposed to Nardin’s argument. Tenson does not go into detail of why he feels that the U.S motive for invading Iraq is irrelevant, and because of that I feel that he has unsuccessfully defended his grand rationale.  

Unjust Humanitarian Intervention in Iraq

The Just War Doctrine states that a war can be defined as “just” if there is a high probability of success. Based on this idea, I believe that the Iraq War was just in the sense that the United States successfully toppled Saddam Hussein’s regime. However, I believe the definition of the Iraq War as a justified humanitarian intervention is fallacious, and the Iraq War was only just in the aspect of toppling the regime and not as a war undertaken to help distance others.

Based on last week’s lecture, the Right to Protect doctrine states that humanitarian intervention would be justified and a responsibility of states if there was a mass atrocity, such as genocide, mass murder, or ethnic killing. The Human Rights Watch adds on to the justification of humanitarian intervention by stating that only countries where there are ongoing or imminent atrocities qualify as targets for intervention. But, based on investigations of Saddam Hussein’s reign, Hussein had ended his state of terror a decade prior to the United States invasion of Iraq in 2003. This being said, according to the Human Rights Watch and Right to Protect doctrine, there should have been no intervention by the United States whatsoever. However, Teson argues that due to the American exceptionalism ideal, the United States has a duty to take down terrorists and spread democracy, regardless of the international policies because the ends justify the means.

I do not agree with his argument that the United States has the right to disregard the process in order to spread democracy by toppling other governments as a way to protect the idea of democracy domestically. As Nardin states, if we disregard the system and policies that determine the legitimacy of a war or intervention, then the United States is no longer following and protecting democracy by cheating the system it is working so hard to protect. If a powerful nation, such as the United States, that even holds a spot in the Security Council disregards the rules, other countries could potentially abuse their power and intervene for any ulterior motive, and justify it as “humanitarian intervention”. If countries begin discounting the process, how can there ever be a lawful international realm.

Furthermore, if the United States and other countries continue to use the idea of ends justifying the means in regards to justifying humanitarian intervention, then there really seems to be no future for humanitarian intervention. By labeling Iraq a humanitarian war, especially after the Right to Protect doctrine and Human Rights Watch specifically deny the notion of Iraq needing humanitarian intervention in 2003, flaws the whole philosophy and intent of a true and legitimate humanitarian intervention for those states who truly needed the outside assistance such as Darfur. The Iraq War has definitely tested the definition and rationalization for humanitarian intervention and the only solution that I see right now is for the United States to recognize its fault in Iraq, learn from the mistakes and develop a new mentality and policy for future humanitarian interventions. 

A Critique of Teson's Claims

            In my opinion, Teson's attempt to justify the Iraq War as "humanitarian" signifies precisely what I find to be flawed within American foreign policy today. My critique of his work mirrors that of Nardin, whom I wholeheartedly agree with. First and foremost, Teson draws a distinction between intent and motive, claiming that if America's intent was to topple Hussein and reconstruct and democratize Iraq, then its intent and the resulting action can be characterized as just despite ulterior motives, which he claims are irrelevant in making a value judgment about the act itself. Assuming that Teson is right in this particular matter of the Iraq War, I find his reasoning to be flawed. The act and the underlying intent with which it is judged may indeed be just; however, one cannot make the leap of logic that solely because an act is JUST it is necessarily humanitarian in nature. Furthermore, Teson indicates that "politicians will never have pure humanitarian motives" but yet that still does not detract from the humanitarian nature of the Iraq War.  Though it is true that pure humanitarian motives are rare, if existent, I think the premise of the war being of humanitarian nature can still be questioned on the grounds that a war which is not guided by predominantly humanitarian goals (and the Iraq War certainly was not) will always run a grave risk of endangering human rights and committing further atrocities, which is somewhat self-defeating in terms of Teson's argument.

             In addition, Teson's piece bears no mention of American foreign policy towards Iraq from the 1980's onward, which I believe weakens his argument tremendously as the perception of a humanitarian war definitely withers at the examination of the past. This relationship entails providing Iraq with intelligence, loans and commodity credits amidst its chemical warfare against Iran in the 1980s and the unfathomable mass murdering of its own people during the same period. Why didn't the U.S. step in back then? This surely casts doubt on the humanitarian intent of the Iraq War, regardless of Teson's arguments that even though the worst violence was over, Hussein was still a threatening tyrant. Furthermore, if the Iraq War was a humanitarian war, then why hadn't the U.S. insisted on more legal actions within the ICC or other non-intervention alternatives? I do not believe that intervention was a pressing or even a 'last' resort at the point in time when the Iraq War happened. I am therefore not convinced by Teson's arguments as I find that the Iraq War was a political and economic venture, with the fall of a brutal dictator as a simple byproduct. The toying around with the "humanitarian" label for the Iraq War regrettably taints this type of intervention for future dire cases where non-intervention might be inexcusable. 

Parallels from Butler and Parra

            I am inclined to agree with aspects of both Butler's and Parra's arguments, but draw a different conclusion about the promises of intervention.  Butler makes the claim that SHEs are far too often simplified into mere problem solving- a type of narrow-minded ordeal that turns a blind eye to the larger context and eliminates altogether the possibility of prevention as key players utilize these emergencies as a starting point rather than a consequence of an alarming neo-liberal global picture. While she uses the example of Kosovo to illustrate this point, aspects of her argument are supported by the Bellamy reading which detailed the lengthy and ineffective response of the international community to the crisis in Darfur. This response consisted of an overly consuming focus of whether to intervene or not and dealings with arbitrary details of "definition" amidst the growing crisis.

            Parra makes a strikingly similar argument to Butler's when she states, "Until now, however, proponents of R2P have concentrated on genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. The reasons for political realism are clear, but genealogically speaking the events of a mass atrocity have a history; they occur in a specific place and time and reflect the convergence of specific social practices, power relations, and discourses, along with their respective truths." Parra goes on to discuss the fact that the 'global south' is often weary and critical of interventions due to the historical circumstances under colonialism and the surrounding issues of hidden Western agendas.

            While Butler champions prevention, she is not necessarily against intervention, yet creates what she deems a more just and contextualizing framework within which intervention can occur (CHIA). Parra, on the other hand, is extremely optimistic that R2P can work if its philosophical and ethical underpinnings are carefully applied. In my opinion, intervention serves to undermine the very arguments Butler and Parra make, as it reinforces the existing neo-liberal global order in which Western interests are promoted under such pretexts as democratization and stability, at the expense of other peoples. (We need only look at U.S. actions in Iraq, its unfaltering alliance with Israel, its lack of action in Rwanda, its "on the fence" policy in Pakistan, etc). This in turn, perpetuates the very circumstances which Butler and Parra deem undesirable, and exacerbates issues that stand at the root of successful and effective humanitarian intervention that the two authors attempt to arrive at.